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a b s t r a c t
We study a risk-averse newsvendor problem with quantity competition and price competition. Under
the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) criterion, we characterize the optimal quantity and pricing
decisions under both quantity and price competition. For quantity competition, we consider two
demand splitting rules, namely proportional demand allocation and demand reallocation. Although
competition always leads to overstocking, interestingly it does not necessarily lead to a proﬁt loss in
certain competitive environments, such as demand reallocation, by avoiding/reducing overstocking that
results from competition under the risk-neutral criterion. For price competition, we consider both
additive and multiplicative demand. We ﬁnd that the order quantity, sale price, and the expected proﬁt
decrease in the degree of risk aversion. Further, both high price sensitivity and competition intensity
force decision makers to lower their prices. However, high price sensitivity always reduces the order
quantity while competition can have the opposite effect.
& 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The newsvendor problem, as one of the fundamental problems
in supply chain management, is an one-time business decision in
which a monopolist vendor orders inventory before a one period
selling season with stochastic demand. The standard newsvendor
problem has been widely studied and extended to more complex
models. We refer interested readers to Khouja (1999), Petruzzi and
Dada (1999) and Qin et al. (2011) for detailed reviews of the
newsvendor problem and its extensions.
To reﬂect the situation in real markets, one major extension of the
newsvendor problem is the replacement of the monopolist vendor
by a set of competing vendors. A key element of the competitive
newsvendor problem relates to how competition affects inventories
and pricing. The two main research streams are quantity competition
and price competition. In recent years, a number of papers have been
devoted to competition analysis in the standard (risk neutral) news-
vendor problem. They ﬁnd that the quantity competition always
leads to inventory overstocking (e.g., Lippman and McCardle, 1997;
Cachon, 2003) and that price competition leads to lower equilibrium
prices and higher stock levels in all ﬁrms (e.g., Chen et al., 2004). An
overview of the key results is provided in Section 2.1.
Ordering and pricing decisions based on quantitative models in
industrial practice and academics are often based on minimizing
the expected cost or maximizing the expected proﬁt, which
implies the concept of risk neutrality of the decision maker.
Nowadays, supply chains become more vulnerable to uncertain-
ties. Besides the expected proﬁt, decision makers focus more on
risk or potential loss. Hence, the assumption of risk neutrality
seems to be inadequate for contemporary supply chain manage-
ment. In view of this, many researchers have called for models that
deviate from the risk neutral assumption. For example, Tsay (2002)
suggests that various players should be allowed to have different
attitudes towards risk sensitivity. Recent empirical ﬁndings pro-
vide further support for the importance of incorporating risk
preferences in business practices. After a survey of 1500 executives
from 90 countries, a McKinsey research report (Koller et al., 2012)
points out that the decision makers demonstrate extreme levels of
risk aversion regardless of the size of the investment, even when
the expected value of a proposed project is strongly positive.
Through an experimental study, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000)
show that the ordering decisions reﬂect risk aversion for high
proﬁt products. Motivated by these arguments, research on risk-
averse models with different objective functions to reﬂect risk
preferences has become an important stream.
Expected utility, mean-variance, and VaR/CVaR are the three
main research streams of modeling risk averseness in inventory
and pricing problems. For the framework of expected utility,
although any concave increasing utility function (e.g., logarithmic
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utility function and loss-aversion utility function) could reﬂect risk-
averse behaviour, the main challenge is how to explicitly specify the
utility function for a decision maker. Note that a utility function
represents both the degree of the diminishing utility inwealth and the
decision makers' attitude toward risk. However, these two aspects
are inseparable from the utility function (e.g., Levy, 2006). Therefore,
expected utility is not a dedicated risk measure and cannot be
implemented in practice. The framework of mean-variance introduced
by Markowitz (1952) is to address the trade-off between the expected
return (mean) and the variation of return (variance). However, the
mean-variance criterion suffers an inherent theoretical ﬂaw in which
both upside and downside variations from the mean are seen as risk.
Although variance is still suitable for the case where the outcome
distribution is close to a symmetric distribution, proﬁt distributions of
inventory models are asymmetric in general (e.g., Ismail and
Louderback, 1979), which implies that variance may not be a reason-
able risk measure. The above argument leads to the use of a downside
risk measure to replace the variance. CVaR, as one important down-
side risk measure, is the conditional expected proﬁt below the amount
VaR, where VaR is deﬁned as the maximum proﬁt at a speciﬁed
conﬁdence level. The CVaR criterion is also a coherent risk measure
that has some desirable structure and computational characteristics
compared to the VaR criterion. Further, as Choi and Ruszczyński
(2008) point out, CVaR represents a trade-off between the expected
proﬁt and a certain risk measure, which means that CVaR takes into
account both the expected proﬁt and the risk. Because of its numerous
advantages, the CVaR criterion has been widely applied both in
theoretical study and in practice. We review the key results of the
newsvendor problem under the CVaR criterion in Section 2.2.
This paper differs from the previous literature on risk-averse
newsvendor models in three ways. First, although several researchers
(e.g., Wang, 2010) have recently considered risk-averse competitive
newsvendor problem under a utility criterion, the aforementioned
drawbacks of the expected-utility framework hinder practical imple-
mentation. Therefore, we replace the utility criterion by the CVaR
criterion that has not been studied in the literature yet. Second, the
literature has only explored the price competition in risk-neutral
newsvendor games (see Chen et al., 2004), and studied the pricing
and quantity decisions of a risk-averse newsvendor without compe-
tition (see Chen et al., 2009). The effect of risk averseness in pricing
competition has not been investigated yet. Third, the literature on
the competitive-newsvendor problem assumes that the newsven-
dors are identical (e.g., Wang, 2010; Chen et al., 2004). The effect of
heterogeneity in the newsvendors on the competitive problem is still
unknown.
To ﬁll these research gaps, we study the risk-averse competitive
newsvendor problem, using CVaR as the risk measure and considering
both quantity competition and price competition. For quantity com-
petition, two types of demand splitting rules (proportional allocation
and reallocation) are proposed. We show that there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium for both competition types. We ﬁnd that risk
averseness decreases the newsvendor's order quantity and may lead
to inventory under stocking. Further, although competition leads to a
higher total order quantity than that of integrated newsvendors
(single newsvendor problem), the total proﬁt of competing news-
vendors may not always decrease. Speciﬁcally, the total proﬁt of risk
averse competitive newsvendors may be higher than that of inte-
grated newsvendors in the demand reallocation problem. For price
competition, the risk averse competition equilibrium has a lower retail
price and a lower order quantity. Meanwhile, the total proﬁt of
competing newsvendors is always lower than that of integrated
newsvendors. Moreover, we show that the equilibrium selling price
decreases with both the elasticity of demand and the proportion of a
newsvendor's unsatisﬁed customers that switch to a competitor
(intensity of price competition). The equilibrium order quantity
decreases with the elasticity of demand, but ﬁrst rises and then drops
with the competition intensity. For the heterogeneous newsvendors,
the newsvendor with a higher degree of risk aversion intends to adopt
a more conservative strategy (e.g., a higher price and a less order
quantity), which results in a smaller market share.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we review the literature on the competitive newsvendor
problem and on the risk-averse newsvendor problem. Section 3 intro-
duces the model setting. Section 4 considers the quantity competitive
newsvendor model. In Section 5, we consider the pricing competitive
newsvendor problem. Section 6 discusses the effects of risk aversion
and competition. Section 7 discusses the heterogeneous competitive
newsvendor problem and presents numerical results. Finally, Section
8 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
The newsvendor literature is surveyed from two aspects:
competition and risk aversion.
2.1. The competitive newsvendor problem
For quantity competition, Lippman and McCardle (1997) consider a
competitive newsvendor problem in which the total demand is
allocated among competing newsvendors under certain demand
splitting rules. Cachon (2003) considers the same newsvendor pro-
blem with a proportional demand allocation rule, i.e., the supplier
allocates demand among the newsvendors proportional to their
orders. Both studies ﬁnd that quantity competition leads to over-
stocking. Wang (2010) extends the newsvendor problem with a
proportional demand allocation rule to a game setting where multiple
newsvendors are loss averse under a utility criterion. They show that
loss aversion leads to a decrease in the newsvendors' total order quan-
tity and may lead to a lower total inventory level of the decentralized
supply chain than that of an integrated supply chain. By using the
same utility criterion as in Wang (2010) and under a demand
reallocation rule, Liu et al. (2013) consider the competitive loss averse
newsvendor problem in which two substitutable products are sold to
two identical retailers. They show that the order quantity of each
retailer is increasing in the loss aversion coefﬁcient and increasing in
the substitution rate.
For price competition, Chen et al. (2004) investigate the price-
dependent competitive newsvendor problem in which the ﬁrm
uses the price to compete for demand. They ﬁnd that competition
leads to lower equilibrium prices and higher stock levels for all
ﬁrms. Zhao and Atkins (2008) study a similar pricing competitive
newsvendor problem. They also ﬁnd that the competitive equili-
brium has higher safety stocks and lower retail prices. Further,
they show that retail prices and safety stocks strictly increase with
the proportion of a newsvendor's unsatisﬁed customers that
switch to a competitor, but strictly decrease with the intensity of
price competition.
2.2. The risk-averse newsvendor problem
Modelling risk-averse newsvendor problems has received con-
siderable attention in recent years. Utility functions (e.g., Lau, 1980;
Agrawal and Seshadri, 2000; Chen et al., 2007; Choi and Ruszczyński,
2011), mean-variance (e.g., Chen and Federgruen, 2000; Wu et al.,
2009) and VaR/CVaR are the three main research streams. We refer
interested readers to Jammernegg and Kischka (2012) for summaries
of the ordering policies of newsvendors with various risk prefer-
ences. Here, we review the key contributions on the CVaR approach,
which is one of the most important ﬁnancial risk measures. CVaR is a
coherent risk measure with attractive computational characteristics
and consequently is widely used in the ﬁnancial ﬁelds. For more
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details of CVaR, we refer to Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000, 2002) and
the references therein.
Ahmed et al. (2007) consider a coherent risk measure for a multi-
period inventory control problem. They show that the structure of
the optimal solution of the risk-averse model is similar to that under
the risk-neutral criterion. Gotoh and Takano (2007) investigate the
risk-averse newsvendor problem under the CVaR criterion. They
show that downside risk measures including CVaR are tractable due
to their convexity. Jammernegg and Kischka (2007) analyze the
ordering policy and its corresponding performance measures, such
as the cycle service level. They consider the trade-off between CVaR
and the expected proﬁt and conclude that a risk-averse (risk-seeking)
newsvendor orders less (more) than a risk-neutral newsvendor. Chen
et al. (2009) examine a price-dependent newsvendor model under
the CVaR criterion, and derive the optimal ordering and pricing
decisions for both the additive and multiplicative demand model.
Choi et al. (2011) study a multi-product risk-averse newsvendor
under the law-invariant coherent measures of risk and show that
increased risk aversion leads to decreased orders. Wu et al. (2013)
explore the risk-averse newsvendor model with random capacity.
The authors ﬁnd that capacity uncertainty decreases the order
quantity under the CVaR criterion. Under the VaR constraint, capacity
uncertainty leads to an order decrease for low conﬁdence levels, but
to an order increase for high conﬁdence levels.
To the best of our knowledge, all literature on the CVaR approach
is based on the standard newsvendor problem in which there only is
a monopoly vendor in the market. Competition under risk averse-
ness has not been studied yet in the literature. An interesting and
unexplored question is what happens in a competitive environment
with risk aversion. This is the main focus of our research, where we
will consider the CVaR approach in order to gain insights into the
effects of both risk averseness and competition on the newsvenders'
optimal strategies and proﬁt performance.
3. Model description
We consider two competing newsvendors selling a perishable
product to the samemarket. For newsvendor i, the purchasing cost of
the product is ci per unit, and the selling price is ri per unit. At the
end of the selling season, we assume that the unsatisﬁed demand is
lost and any leftover inventory can be salvaged at a unit value si. To
avoid unrealistic and trivial cases, we assume that ri4ci4si40. We
denote newsvendor i's order quantity as Qi and assume that news-
vendor i faces random demand Di with a cumulative distribution
function (CDF) FiðÞ and probability density function (PDF) f iðÞ. We
also let f T ðÞ and FT ðÞ denote the PDF and CDF of the total random
demand DT of all newsvendors, respectively. Without loss of general-
ity, we assume that FT ð0Þ ¼ Fið0Þ ¼ 0. Throughout this paper, we drop
out the subscript for identical newsvendors and suppose that
information on each newsvendor's demand distribution and cost
structure is common knowledge to all newsvendors.
We consider the risk-averse newsvendor under the CVaR criter-
ion. CVaR maximizes the average proﬁt of the proﬁt falling below a
certain quantile level which is deﬁned as the maximum proﬁt at a








where φ reﬂects the target proﬁt of the newsvendor and ηA ð0;1
reﬂects the degree of risk aversion, i.e., a lower value implies a higher
degree of risk aversion.
The aim of the risk averse decision maker is to minimize the
downside risk of his proﬁt. In other words, the object of decision




Note that, for η¼1, the CVaR is equal to the expected proﬁt.
4. Quantity competition
In this section, we consider two competition models with two
risk averse competing newsvendors. Both models have a ﬁxed
retail price and competition occurs by allocating demand among
the newsvendors proportional to their inventory, or by reallocat-
ing their excess demands among the newsvendors, respectively.
4.1. A proportional demand allocation problem
We assume that the total demand DT is divided among the








Such a demand allocation rule is known as the proportional demand
allocation rule in the literature. As pointed out by Cachon (2003), this
rule is a reasonable model when customers have a relatively low
search cost (e.g., online shopping) and the qualitative insights from
this rule are consistent with other demand allocation rules consid-
ered in the literature (e.g., Lippman and McCardle, 1997).
The newsvendor i's proﬁt is












Proposition 4.1 characterizes newsvendor i's best response to
the other newsvendor's order quantity under the risk-averse
criterion. The proofs of this result and of further results that will
be presented are given in the appendix.
Proposition 4.1. Under the CVaR criterion, for any given QjZ0,
there exists a unique optimal order quantity Qni ðQjÞ for a risk-averse
newsvendor that satisﬁes the following ﬁrst-order conditions.











Z FT  1 ðηÞ
0
x dFT ðxÞ ¼ ηðcsÞ
rs : ð3Þ
Due to the complexity of (2) and (3), we are unable to derive
closed form expressions for the optimal ordering quantities in
general. Next, we therefore consider ﬁrms that are identical.
Under the risk-neutral criterion, Cachon (2003) shows that, for
identical newsvendors, there exists a unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium in the risk-neutral demand allocation game. Speciﬁ-






x dFT ðxÞ ¼ rc
rs: ð4Þ
Under the CVaR criterion, for identical risk averse newsvendors,
we have the following result.
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Theorem 1. Under the CVaR criterion, the unique equilibrium order






x dFT ðxÞ ¼ ηðrcÞ
rs : ð5Þ
4.2. A demand reallocation problem
In this model, there are two aspects of demand: the initial
allocation and the reallocation. Demand is initially independent of
the inventory levels chosen by the ﬁrms. However, if applicable, a
portion of the excess demand is reallocated to other ﬁrms. This is
considered to be the most general demand allocation scheme for
competitive newsvendors (e.g., Lippman and McCardle, 1997).
Let Di denote the initial demand for ﬁrm i. If there is unsatisﬁed
demand at ﬁrm j, i.e., Dj4Qj, then some portion of the unsatisﬁed
customers attempts to make a purchase at ﬁrm i. This transfer of
excess demand represents the reallocation. Further, we assume
that Di and Dj are independent and let Ri denote the effective
demand at ﬁrm i, including its reallocation, so that
Ri ¼DiþγiðDjQjÞþ ;
where γi, 0rγir1, equals the proportion of ﬁrm j's excess
demand that is allocated to ﬁrm i.
We can express the newsvendor i's proﬁt πðQi;RiÞ as follows:
πðQi;RiÞ ¼ πðQi;QjÞ ¼ riðQi4RiÞþsiðQiRiÞþ ciQi
¼ ðriciÞQiðrisiÞðQiRiÞþ
¼ ðriciÞQiðrisiÞðQiDiγiðDjQjÞþ Þþ ;













Proposition 4.2 characterizes newsvendor i's best response to
the other newsvendor's order quantity under the risk-averse
criterion.
Proposition 4.2. Under the CVaR criterion, for any given QjZ0,
there exists a unique optimal order quantity Qni ðQjÞ for a risk-averse














As in Section 4.1, we next consider the special case with two
identical newsvendors, speciﬁcally in their abilities to attract
customers in both the initial allocation and the reallocation.
Under the risk neutral criterion, by applying Theorem 6 in
Lippman and McCardle (1997), the equilibrium order quantities QnE







Under the CVaR criterion, by applying Theorem 6 in Lippman
and McCardle (1997), the equilibrium order quantities of identical
risk averse newsvendors satisﬁes the following result.
Theorem 2. With identical ﬁrms and continuous distributions, for
risk-averse newsvendors under the CVaR criterion, there exists a









For tractability, we assume that there is no direct competition
regarding inventory decisions, i.e., ﬁrms make combined price and
inventory decisions and compete for market demand by using
price as the strategy variable. For a general demand model, pricing
behaviour is difﬁcult to analyze even for a risk neutral news-
vendor. In the literature of the newsvendor problem with pricing,
two kinds of demand are extensively used: additive and multi-
plicative. Thus, two types of demand faced by the newsvendor
i are deﬁned as follows:
Diðri; rjÞ ¼ dðri; rjÞþϵi and Diðri; rjÞ ¼ dðri; rjÞϵi;
where dðri; rjÞ is the mean of newsvendor i's demand, i.e.,
dðri; rjÞ ¼ EðDiðri; rjÞÞ which is a continuous, strictly decreasing, non-
negative, twice-differential function and has an increasing price
elasticity (IPE), i.e., ∂ððri=dðri; rjÞÞ∂dðri; rjÞ=∂riÞ=∂riZ0. Here, ϵi is a
random price-independent component of demand deﬁned on a
certain range, which is called demand risk. Further, dðri; rjÞ is deﬁned
on a closed interval ½ci; r i where r i is the maximum admissible price
for newsvendor i. We assume that ϵi has a continuous distribution
ΦiðÞ with density ϕiðÞ. For additive demand, ϵi is deﬁned on ½L;U
ðLo0;U40Þ, and EðϵiÞ ¼ 0;VARðϵiÞo1. For multiplicative demand,
ϵi is deﬁned on ½0;U ðU40Þ and EðϵiÞ ¼ 1;VARðϵiÞo1.
To keep the exposition simple, we focus on the linear form of
mean demand. Thus, mean demand faced by newsvendor i is
deﬁned as follows:
dðri; rjÞ ¼ dαriþβðrjriÞ;
where d is the average demand for each newsvendor; α is the
price-sensitivity factor and β is the cross-price sensitivity factor
which represents the portion of newsvendor j's lost sales switch-
ing to newsvendor i. By deﬁnition, it is clear that dðri; rjÞ has an IPE
and the demand faced by each newsvendor is dependent on their
own prices as well as the price of the competing newsvendor. This
linear form has been widely used in the literature on operations/
marketing interfaces (e.g., Tsay and Agrawal, 2000). Furthermore,
the demand risk ϵi is often assumed to exhibit an increasing failure
rate (IFR). A random variable ξ has an IFR if ðϕðξÞ=ð1ΦðξÞÞÞ0Z0
for all ξ in its domain. Most widely used distributions (e.g., the
uniform, normal, negative exponential, Weibull and gamma dis-
tributions) in the operations management literatures have an IFR
(see Lariviere, 2006).
5.1. Additive demand
Newsvendor i's proﬁt πðri; rj;QiÞ is given by
πðri; rj;QiÞ ¼ riðQi4Diðri; rjÞÞþsiðQiDiðri; rjÞÞþ ciQ i
¼ ðriciÞQiðrisiÞðQiDiðri; rjÞÞþ ;
and its expectation is
EðπðQi;Di; riÞÞ ¼ ðriciÞQiðrisiÞ
Z Qi dðri ;rjÞ
L
ðQidðri; rjÞxÞdΦiðxÞ:
For newsvendor i, the relevant decision is to ﬁnd a price rni A ½ci; ri 
that maximizes its expected proﬁt, and the corresponding optimal
order quantity is Qni ðrni Þ.
Proposition 5.1 characterizes the newsvendor i's best response
to the other newsvendor's pricing strategy under the CVaR
criterion.
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Proposition 5.1. For any given rj, if each demand risk distributionΦi
has an IFR, then there exists a unique optimal price rni ðrjÞ for a risk-







þdðrni ðrjÞ; rjÞðrni ðrjÞciÞðαþβÞ
þ1
η
Z Φ 1i ððηðrni ðrjÞ ciÞÞ=ðrni ðrjÞ siÞÞ
L
x dΦiðxÞ ¼ 0;
and the optimal order quantity Qni ðrni Þ is





Next, we consider the special case with two identical newsvendors
in order to obtain closed-form results for ordering quantities.
Under the CVaR criterion, the equilibrium order quantities and
selling prices of identical risk averse newsvendors satisﬁes the
following result.
Theorem 3. With identical ﬁrms and continuous demand risk distribu-
tions, for risk-averse newsvendors with additive demand under the
CVaR criterion, if each demand risk distribution Φ has an IFR, then










Z Φ 1ððηðrnCVaR  cÞÞ=ðrnCVaR  sÞÞ
L
x dΦðxÞ ¼ 0; ð9Þ






Under the risk neutral criterion, the equilibrium order quanti-
ties and selling prices of identical risk neutral newsvendors satisfy
the following result.
Corollary 1. With identical ﬁrms and continuous demand risk
distributions, for risk-neutral newsvendors with additive demand, if
each demand risk distribution Φ has an IFR, then there exists a









Z Φ 1ððrnE  cÞ=ðrnE  sÞÞ
L
x dΦðxÞ ¼ 0; ð11Þ







Newsvendor i's expected proﬁt is




Proposition 5.2 characterizes newsvendor i's best response to
the other newsvendor's pricing strategy under the CVaR criterion.
Proposition 5.2. For any given rj40, if each demand risk distribu-
tion Φi has an IFR, then there exists a unique optimal price rni ðrjÞ for












Z Φ 1i ððηðrni ðrjÞ cÞÞ=ðrni ðrjÞ sÞÞ
0
x dΦiðxÞ ¼ 0;
and the optimal order quantity Qni ðrni Þ is





Next, we consider the special case with two identical newsvendors
in order to obtain closed form results for the ordering quantities.
Under the CVaR criterion, the equilibrium order quantities and
selling prices of identical risk averse newsvendors satisﬁes the
following result.
Theorem 4. With identical ﬁrms and continuous distributions, for
risk-averse newsvendors with multiplicative demand under the CVaR
criterion, if each demand risk distribution Φ has an IFR, then there











Z Φ 1ððηðrnCVaR  cÞÞ=ðrnCVaR  sÞÞ
0
x dΦðxÞ ¼ 0; ð13Þ






Under the risk neutral criterion, the equilibrium order quanti-
ties and selling prices of identical risk neutral newsvendors
satisﬁes the following result.
Corollary 2. With identical ﬁrms and continuous distributions, for
risk-neutral newsvendors with multiplicative demand, if each
demand risk distribution Φ has an IFR, then there exists a unique








Z Φ 1ððrnE  cÞ=ðrnE  sÞÞ
0
x dΦðxÞ ¼ 0; ð15Þ





dðrnE ; rnEÞ: ð16Þ
6. The effect of risk aversion and competition
Having characterized the optimal price and quantity decisions
for risk averse newsvendors in various competitive settings, we
discuss the effects of both risk averseness and competition on the
newvendors' optimal strategies.
For quantity competition, we have the following results.
Theorem 5. For both proportional demand allocation and demand
reallocation problems, the equilibrium order quantity QnCVaR of two
identical risk averse newsvendors decreases with respect to the
degree of risk aversion. In other words, risk aversion leads to a
decrease in the optimal order quantities of both ﬁrms.
Theorem 5 indicates that risk averse newsvendors are less
inclined to increase the order quantity. Therefore, the negative
M. Wu et al. / Int. J. Production Economics 156 (2014) 13–23 17
impact of overstock on the proﬁt caused by quantity competition
(Lippman and McCardle, 1997) can be reduced.
For price competition, we have the following results.
Theorem 6. Consider two identical risk averse newsvendors and
suppose that each demand risk distribution Φ has an IFR.
(a) Additive demand: both the equilibrium selling prices rnCVaR and
the equilibrium order quantities QnCVaR decrease with respect to
the degree of risk aversion.
(b) Multiplicative demand: ifΦ satisﬁes ðΦðxÞ=xϕðxÞÞ0Z0, then both
the equilibrium selling prices rnCVaR and the equilibrium order
quantities QnCVaR decrease with the degree of risk aversion.
Remark 1. The condition ðΦðxÞ=xϕðxÞÞ0Z0 is satisﬁed by most
common distributions, such as the uniform, negative exponential,
Weibull and gamma distributions, all of which also have IFR (Chen
et al., 2009). However, this condition is not satisﬁed by the normal
distribution although that does have an IFR. We perform a
numerical investigation in Section 7.4 to discuss the effect of risk
averseness for normal distributed demand risk.
Similar to quantity competition, risk averseness leads to
reduced order quantities for price competition. However, different
from quantity competition, it is not necessary beneﬁcial for the
newsvendors. Whereas risk neutral newsvendors always overstock
under quantity competition (Lippman and McCardle, 1997), this is
not always true under price competition, as stated in Theorem 7.
Theorem 7. Consider two identical risk neutral or risk averse
newsvendors and suppose that each demand risk distribution Φ
has an IFR. For both additive demand and multiplicative demand, the
following holds:
(a) The equilibrium selling price rnCVaR (or r
n
E) is decreasing in the
intensity of price competition β. However, the equilibrium order
quantity QnCVaR (or Q
n
E) may increase or decrease with respect to
the intensity of competition β. Speciﬁcally, there exist a unique
β0A ½0;1 so that if βrβ0, then the equilibrium order quantity
increases with respect to β, otherwise the equilibrium order
quantity is decreasing.
(b) Both the equilibrium selling price rnCVaR (or r
n
E) and the equilibrium
order quantity QnCVaR (or Q
n
E) are decreasing in the price sensitivity α.
From Theorem 7, we ﬁnd that both intensive price competition
and high price sensitivity force decision makers to reduce their order
quantities and lower their prices. In such situations, further risk
aversion incentives to reduce order quantities may lead to a high
possibility of out-of-stock compared with an integrated newsvendor
perspective. Furthermore, it has also been shown (see e.g., Chen et al.,
2004; Zhao and Atkins, 2008) that competition leads to a lower (than
integrally optimal) equilibrium price for risk neutral newsvendors, and
Theorem 6 shows that the price drops even further for risk averse
newsvendors.
7. Nonidentical newsvendors: a numerical investigation
In this section, we consider the heterogeneous case with one
risk neutral and one risk averse vendor. In order to obtain insights
into the effects of risk perspective on the competitive outcome for
newsvendors, in Sections 7.1-7.4, we will consider quantity com-
petition with proportional demand allocation and demand reallo-
cation, price competition with additive demand and multiplicative
demand, respectively. For all four models, we ﬁrst derive a pair of
optimality conditions. Then, we perform a numerical study on
equilibrium quantities and prices. We remark that parameter
settings other than those considered lead to the same qualitative
ﬁndings.
7.1. A proportional demand allocation problem
For heterogeneous newsvendors, based on a similar analysis as
for Section 4.1, we can prove that the optimal equilibrium solu-
tions are given by the ﬁrst-order conditions. More speciﬁcally, for
a risk-neutral newsvendor and a risk-averse newsvendor, under
the CVaR criterion, the optimal pair of order quantity ðQnEN ;Q
n
CVaRN Þ
satisﬁes the following ﬁrst-order conditions.
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Let us consider the following example: r¼3, c¼1, s¼0.5 and
DT Nð4;2Þ. Tables 1 and 2 give the order quantities for the hetero-
geneous case and the homogeneous case with either two risk neutral
or two risk averse ﬁrms, for different levels of risk averseness η.
Keeping in mind that a lower value for η implies a higher
degree of risk averseness, we observe that, for the heterogeneous
case, the market share of the risk neutral ﬁrm grows with the level
of risk averseness for the other ﬁrm. In fact, for smaller values of η
in the considered range, the risk averse newsvendor is almost
completely pushed out of the market.
It further appears from Tables 1 and 2 that the total order quantity
of heterogeneous newsvendors is lower than that of identical risk
neutral newsvendors. However, the total proﬁt of heterogeneous
newsvendors may be higher than that of identical risk neutral news-
vendors. This relates to the observation in Section 5 that risk neutral
newsvendors overstock in this type of competitive environment, and
that risk averseness can help counter this effect. We remark that the
optimal order quantity of the integrated newsvendor (the single
newsvendor problem) is 5.19 for this example and the total order
quantity of the risk neutral competitive newsvendors is 7.043.
Comparing these two values, we obtain that the competition between
risk neutral newsvendors leads to a 92.7% overstock and 29% proﬁt
reduction. However, if either both newsvendors are mildly risk averse
ð0:6rηr0:8Þ or one of them is very risk averse ðηr0:5Þ, then the
proﬁt reduction is less than 3%.
7.2. A demand reallocation problem
Similar to Section 7.1, for heterogeneous newsvendors, we can
prove that the optimal equilibrium solutions are given by the ﬁrst-
















0.33 5.001 1.846 (5.177, 0.028) 0.7 5.001 2.700 (4.668, 1.906)
0.4 5.001 1.999 (5.024, 0.375) 0.8 5.001 3.044 (4.714, 2.557)
0.5 5.001 2.214 (4.847, 0.865) 0.9 5.001 3.635 (4.875, 3.477)
0.6 5.001 2.439 (4.723, 1.365) 1.0 5.001 5.001 (5.001, 5.001)
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Suppose that each demand is normally distributed with mean
2 and standard deviation 1. Let r¼3, c¼1, s¼0.5 and γ¼1. We remark
that if γ ¼ 1, then the market can be regarded as a fully competitive
market (i.e., a newsvendor's lost sale fully switches to a competitor).
The equilibrium order quantity and the proﬁt on equilibrium order
quantity with different η are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
Different from the proportional demand model, the gain in the
total proﬁt from having one or two risk averse newsvendors is much
bigger than that in the proportional demand model. This is explained
by the fact that only part of the demand can now be reallocated.
As for the example in Section 7.1, the optimal order quantity
and corresponding proﬁt of the risk neutral integrated news-
vendor are 5.19 and 7.043, respectively. Note from Tables 3 and 4
that two risk neutral competitive newsvendors actually achieve a
higher proﬁt (7.38) by ordering more (5.908), which is counter
intuitive. The explanation is that under the demand reallocation,
the market size is enlarged due to the potential customer switch-
ing. For this reason, there is also less beneﬁt of reduced order
quantities through risk averseness, although having one risk
averse newsvendor can still lead to a small gain (less than 1%)
compared to having two competing risk neutral newsvendors.
7.3. Price competition with additive demand
For heterogeneous newsvendors, based on a similar analysis as for
Section 5.1, we can prove that the optimal equilibrium solutions are
given by the ﬁrst-order conditions. The optimal pair of selling price
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Suppose that each demand risk is normally distributed with
mean 2 and standard deviation 1, i.e, ϵi Nð0;1Þ. Let d¼5, c¼2,
s¼1, α¼0.2 and β¼0.4. The equilibrium selling price, order
quantity and proﬁt on equilibrium order quantity with different
η are shown in Tables 5–7.
For the considered example, the optimal selling price and order
quantity of the integrated newsvendor are 13.44 and 6.61, respectively.
The proﬁt of the integrated newsvendor is 50.46. Tables 5–7 show that
risk neutral competitive newsvendors again overstocking (36%). They
also lower their price by 43%, which leads to a 26% proﬁt reduction. As
for quantity competition, having one risk averse newsvendor helps us
to reduce the overstocking. However, the risk averse newsvendor
(further) reduces its selling price to hedge against the demand
Table 2
Proﬁts for proportional demand allocation problem.
η πnE π
n
CVaR ðπnEN ; πnCVaRN Þ η πnE πnCVaR ðπnEN ; πnCVaRN Þ
0.33 2.501 3.164 (6.975, 0.038) 0.7 2.501 3.501 (4.734, 1.933)
0.4 2.501 3.295 (6.515, 0.487) 0.8 2.501 3.425 (4.120, 2.235)
0.5 2.501 3.424 (5.900, 1.053) 0.9 2.501 3.177 (3.400, 2.425)
0.6 2.501 3.494 (5.314, 1.536) 1.0 2.501 2.501 (2.501, 2.501)
Table 3












0.1 2.954 1.179 (4.595, 0.596) 0.6 2.954 2.213 (3.358, 1.985)
0.2 2.954 1.482 (4.188, 1.009) 0.7 2.954 2.376 (3.229, 2.201)
0.3 2.954 1.700 (3.910, 1.302) 0.8 2.954 2.546 (3.120, 2.425)
0.4 2.954 1.884 (3.692, 1.547) 0.9 2.954 2.733 (3.059, 2.670)
0.5 2.954 2.052 (3.511, 1.770) 1 2.954 2.954 (2.954, 2.954)
Table 4
Proﬁts for demand reallocation problem.
η πnE π
n
CVaR ðπnEN ; πnCVaRN Þ η πnE πnCVaR ðπnEN ; πnCVaRN Þ
0.1 3.690 2.300 (6.251, 1.157) 0.6 3.690 3.579 (4.242, 3.178)
0.2 3.690 2.801 (5.520, 1.890) 0.7 3.690 3.653 (4.064, 3.358)
0.3 3.690 3.106 (5.060, 2.350) 0.8 3.690 3.697 (3.915, 3.504)
0.4 3.690 3.318 (4.723, 2.690) 0.9 3.690 3.711 (3.791, 3.616)
0.5 3.690 3.470 (4.457, 2.959) 1 3.690 3.690 (3.690, 3.690)
Table 5
Equilibrium selling price for the quantity and pricing model with additive demand.
η rnE r
n
CVaR ðrnEN ; rnCVaRN Þ η rnE rnCVaR ðrnEN ; rnCVaRN Þ
0.1 7.663 5.644 (7.152, 6.149) 0.6 7.663 6.936 (7.479, 7.118)
0.2 7.663 6.034 (7.251, 6.442) 0.7 7.663 7.113 (7.524, 7.251)
0.3 7.663 6.316 (7.322, 6.653) 0.8 7.663 7.288 (7.569, 7.382)
0.4 7.663 6.547 (7.381, 6.827) 0.9 7.663 7.468 (7.614, 7.517)
0.5 7.663 6.750 (7.432, 6.979) 1 7.663 7.663 (7.663, 7.663)
Table 6













0.1 4.503 2.456 (4.153, 2.770) 0.6 4.503 3.610 (4.378, 3.726)
0.2 4.503 2.800 (4.221, 3.054) 0.7 4.503 3.793 (4.408, 3.882)
0.3 4.503 3.042 (4.270, 3.253) 0.8 4.503 3.990 (4.439, 4.051)
0.4 4.503 3.245 (4.310, 3.420) 0.9 4.503 4.216 (4.470, 4.248)
0.5 4.503 3.430 (4.345, 3.575) 1 4.503 4.503 (4.503, 4.503)
Table 7
Proﬁts for the quantity and pricing model with additive demand.
η πnE π
n
CVaR ðπnEN ; πnCVaRN Þ η πnE πnCVaR ðπnEN ; πnCVaRN Þ
0.1 18.600 8.885 (15.281, 11.419) 0.6 18.600 15.780 (17.369, 16.944)
0.2 18.600 11.028 (15.898, 13.268) 0.7 18.600 16.601 (17.666, 17.501)
0.3 18.600 12.566 (16.352, 14.524) 0.8 18.600 17.340 (17.960, 17.966)
0.4 18.600 13.805 (16.727, 15.493) 0.9 18.600 18.007 (18.265, 18.338)
0.5 18.600 14.858 (17.060, 16.284) 1 18.600 18.600 (18.600, 18.600)
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uncertainty, leading to an even lower overall proﬁt. Indeed, the proﬁt
loss, compared to having two competing risk neutral newsvendors,
can be up to 29%. This implies that, although risk averseness can avoid
overstocking, competition eventually leads to proﬁt loss in the pricing
competition environment.
Next, we present another example with η¼0.1 to illustrate the
effect of competition intensity. The equilibrium selling price, order
quantity and proﬁt on equilibrium order quantity with different
values of β are shown in Tables 8–10.
Tables 8–10 show that both homogeneous newsvendors offer a
lower price and obtain a lower proﬁt when competition becomes
more ﬁerce. However, the order quantity ﬁrst rises and then falls.
Since the selling price is decreasing with respect to the intensity
of competition, the increase of safety stock Φ1ððηðrnCVaRcÞÞ=
ðrnCVaRsÞÞ exceeds the decrease of average demand dðrnCVaR; rnCVaRÞ in
a less competitive environment. However, if competition becomes
more ﬁerce, the decrease of average demand exceeds the decrease of
safety stock which leads to a lower order quantity.
For heterogeneous newsvendors, most of the observations for
homogeneous newsvendors still apply. It further appears from
Tables 8 to 10 that differences in decisions between heterogenous
newsvendors decrease with the intensity of price competition.
This implies that, in a cut-throat, heavily competitive market (i.e.,
β is sufﬁcient large), heterogenous newsvendors apply the same
pricing and ordering policies, even if they have different risk
attitudes. In other words, ﬁerce competition moderates the effect
of risk averseness.
One more example with η¼0.1 illustrates the effect of price
sensitivity. The equilibrium selling price, order quantity and proﬁt
on equilibrium order quantity with different α are shown in
Tables 11–13. These results show that both homogeneous news-
vendors offer a lower price and get a lower proﬁt when demand
becomes more sensitivity to price changes. However, again the order
quantity ﬁrst rises and then falls. For heterogeneous newsvendors,
most of the observation for homogeneous newsvendors still apply.
Also, the differences in decisions between heterogenous newsvendors
and the total proﬁt of both newsvendors decrease with price
sensitivity. This implies that, in a market which has numerous
substitutable goods (i.e., α is sufﬁcient large), heterogenous news-
vendors select almost the same price. Moreover, none of them is able
to maintain a high proﬁt.
7.4. Price competition with multiplicative demand
For heterogeneous newsvendors, based on a similar analysis as
for Section 5.2, we can prove that the optimal equilibrium solutions
are given by the ﬁrst-order conditions. The optimal pair of selling
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Since most of the properties for multiplicative demand are similar
to that for additive demand, we consider a normal distributed demand
risk to explore what happens if the condition of part (b) in Theorem 6
is not satisﬁed. Let us consider the following example: c¼2, s¼1, d¼3,
α¼0.2, β¼0.4 and ϵi Nð1;0:52Þ. The equilibrium selling price, order
Table 8
Equilibrium selling price for the quantity and pricing model with additive demand.
β rnE r
n
CVaR ðrnEN ; rnCVaRN Þ β rnE rnCVaR ðrnEN ; rnCVaRN Þ
0.5 7.023 5.235 (6.545, 5.706) 2.5 3.490 2.975 (3.322, 3.139)
1 5.192 4.067 (4.854, 4.398) 3 3.258 2.825 (3.115, 2.964)
1.5 4.325 3.512 (4.070, 3.761) 3.5 3.086 2.714 (2.962, 2.834)
2 3.820 3.188 (3.617, 3.386) 4 2.953 2.628 (2.884, 2.734)
Table 9













0.5 4.565 2.523 (4.185, 2.865) 2.5 4.551 2.754 (4.053, 3.215)
1 4.673 2.691 (4.218, 3.105) 3 4.492 2.742 (3.993, 3.205)
1.5 4.657 2.744 (4.175, 3.187) 3.5 4.434 2.725 (3.937, 3.189)
2 4.609 2.758 (4.115, 3.213) 4 4.379 2.707 (3.884, 3.170)
Table 10
Proﬁts for the quantity and pricing model with additive demand.
β πnE π
n
CVaR ðπnEN ; πnCVaRN Þ β πnE πnCVaR ðπnEN ; πnCVaRN Þ
0.5 17.016 8.109 (13.827, 10.553) 2.5 5.597 2.677 (4.349, 3.651)
1 11.639 5.532 (9.213, 7.409) 3 4.708 2.257 (3.652, 3.083)
1.5 8.676 4.131 (6.798, 5.589) 3.5 4.043 1.942 (3.132, 2.655)
2 6.837 3.263 (5.329, 4.438) 4 3.529 1.697 (2.732, 2.322)
Table 11
Equilibrium selling price for the quantity and pricing model with additive demand.
α rnE r
n
CVaR ðrnEN ; rnCVaRN Þ α rnE rnCVaR ðrnEN ; rnCVaRN Þ
0.2 7.663 5.644 (7.152, 6.149) 0.8 3.567 2.801 (3.451, 2.917)
0.4 5.397 4.078 (5.127, 4.344) 1.0 3.099 2.460 (3.012, 2.551)
0.6 4.258 3.286 (4.089, 3.452) 1.2 2.756 2.143 (2.683, 2.264)
Table 12













0.2 4.503 2.456 (4.153, 2.770) 0.8 2.427 1.058 (2.258, 1.214)
0.4 3.589 1.874 (3.335, 2.100) 1.0 1.960 0.681 (1.811, 0.828)
0.6 2.950 1.441 (2.749, 1.622) 1.2 1.518 0.187 (1.375, 0.415)
Table 13
Proﬁts for the quantity and pricing model with additive demand.
α πnE π
n
CVaR ðπnEN ; πnCVaRN Þ α πnE πnCVaR ðπnEN ; πnCVaRN )
0.2 18.600 8.885 (15.281, 11.419) 0.8 2.534 0.842 (2.133, 1.106)
0.4 8.638 3.865 (7.242, 4.888) 1.0 1.370 0.312 (1.132, 0.455)
0.6 4.590 1.840 (3.877, 2.339) 1.2 0.678 0.025 (0.531, 0.110)
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quantity and proﬁt on equilibrium order quantity with different η are
shown in Tables 14–16.
Tables 14–16 show that, for homogeneous newsvendors, moderate
risk averseness still leads to a lower price and a lower order quantity,
which is consistent with the competition under the additive demand.
However, if newsvendors are very risk averse, then they offer a higher
selling price, which is different from that in the additive demand
model. The explanation for this result is that, although a higher price
leads to a lower average demand, it also reduces the uncertainty. Note
that the normal distribution does not satisfy the condition of part
(b) in Theorem 6, which implies that newsvendors may offer a higher
price rather than lower the price. Therefore, it is important to carefully
select the distribution of demand risk.
Compared with the additive demand, it further appears from
Tables 14 to 16 that the total proﬁt of heterogeneous newsvendors
may be higher than that of identical risk neutral newsvendors. This
relates to the fact that risk averseness could avoid overstocking and
raise selling prices. For the considered example, the optimal selling
price and order quantity of the integrated newsvendor are 8.806 and
3.884, respectively. The proﬁt of the integrated newsvendor is 15.61.
However, the selling price of the risk neutral competitive newsvendors
is 5.607, the total order quantity is 5.226 and the total proﬁt is 11.63,
which results in 34.6% overstock, a 36.3% price dropping and a 25.5%
proﬁt decrease.
For the heterogeneous newsvendors, compared to the inte-
grally optimal solution, for part of the considered range of values
for η, having one rather than two risk averse newsvendors leads to
a total ordering quantity close to the integrated optimum of 3.884.
However, the asymmetry in order quantities can still lead to a
considerable proﬁt loss, compared to having two competing risk
neutral newsvendors, of up to 6.3%. This implies that, although risk
averseness can avoid overstocking, competition eventually leads to
proﬁt loss for both additive demand and multiplicative demand.
As in Section 7.3, we ﬁnally present two examples with η¼0.1 to
illustrate the effect of competition intensity and that of price sensitiv-
ity, respectively. The assumptions of the previous example still apply
and we let η¼0.1. The equilibrium selling price, order quantity and
proﬁt on equilibrium order quantity with different β and that with
different α are shown in Tables 17–19 and in Tables 20–22, respec-
tively. From Tables 17 to 22, we observe similar phenomena as for the
additive model.
Now, we brieﬂy summarize the effect of heterogeneity on equili-
brium quantities and prices. For quantity competition, risk averseness
can avoid overstocking under both demand splitting rules. The risk-
neutral newsvendor gains a bigger market share and higher proﬁt
than the risk-averse newsvendor does. Under the proportional
demand allocation, newsvendors beneﬁt from reducing the overstock
through risk averseness. However, reducing the overstock may lead to
a lower proﬁt under demand reallocation. For price competition, risk
averseness avoids overstocking and leads to a lower selling price in
both the additive demand model and the multiplicative demand
models. However, the impact of risk averseness on the optimal
strategies becomes weak in an intensely competitive market.
Table 14




CVaR ðrnEN ; rnCVaRN Þ η rnE rnCVaR ðrnEN ; rnCVaRN Þ
0.1 5.607 6.535 (6.382, 7.871) 0.6 5.607 5.518 (5.713, 5.915)
0.2 5.607 5.890 (6.076, 6.976) 0.7 5.607 5.513 (5.676, 5.808)
0.3 5.607 5.686 (5.923, 6.527) 0.8 5.607 5.525 (5.647, 5.724)
0.4 5.607 5.590 (5.827, 6.248) 0.9 5.607 5.554 (5.625, 5.658)
0.5 5.607 5.541 (5.761, 6.056) 1 5.607 5.607 (5.607, 5.607)
Table 15













0.1 2.613 0.515 (3.355, 0.262) 0.6 2.613 1.818 (2.713, 1.688)
0.2 2.613 0.913 (3.059, 0.642) 0.7 2.613 2.004 (2.678, 1.908)
0.3 2.613 1.193 (2.911, 0.953) 0.8 2.613 2.192 (2.651, 2.129)
0.4 2.613 1.423 (2.821, 1.220) 0.9 2.613 2.391 (2.630, 2.360)
0.5 2.613 1.627 (2.758, 1.462) 1 2.613 2.613 (2.613, 2.613)
Table 16
Proﬁts for the quantity and pricing model with multiplicative demand.
η πnE π
n
CVaR ðπnEN ; πnCVaRN Þ η πnE πnCVaR ðπnEN ; πnCVaRN Þ
0.1 5.816 2.263 (8.955, 1.491) 0.6 5.816 5.081 (6.202, 5.247)
0.2 5.816 3.317 (7.632, 2.986) 0.7 5.816 5.324 (6.066, 5.488)
0.3 5.816 3.957 (7.008, 3.883) 0.8 5.816 5.523 (5.961, 5.660)
0.4 5.816 4.423 (6.635, 4.488) 0.9 5.816 5.687 (5.879, 5.771)
0.5 5.816 4.787 (6.384, 4.924) 1 5.816 5.816 (5.816, 5.816)
Table 17




CVaR ðrnEN ; rnCVaRN Þ β rnE rnCVaR ðrnEN ; rnCVaRN Þ
0.5 5.242 6.156 (6.035, 7.397) 2.5 3.141 3.791 (3.698, 4.271)
1 4.179 5.006 (4.935, 5.922) 3 2.992 3.605 (3.502, 4.009)
1.5 3.660 4.412 (4.340, 5.129) 3.5 2.879 3.463 (3.350, 3.805)
2 3.349 4.044 (3.962, 4.625) 4 2.791 3.350 (3.229, 3.642)
Table 18













0.5 2.654 0.530 (3.522, 0.262) 2.5 2.470 0.537 (4.304, 0.185)
1 2.687 0.560 (3.993, 0.245) 3 2.396 0.523 (4.306, 0.169)
1.5 2.626 0.561 (4.189, 0.224) 3.5 2.327 0.508 (4.291, 0.155)
2 2.548 0.551 (4.274, 0.203) 4 2.263 0.493 (4.266, 0.143)
Table 19
Proﬁts for the quantity and pricing model with multiplicative demand.
β πnE π
n
CVaR ðπnEN ; πnCVaRN Þ β πnE πnCVaR ðπnEN ; πnCVaRN Þ
0.5 5.345 2.136 (8.703, 1.370) 2.5 1.839 0.935 (4.696, 0.408)
1 3.718 1.635 (7.321, 0.934) 3 1.557 0.816 (4.177, 0.330)
1.5 2.803 1.313 (6.201, 0.679) 3.5 1.345 0.723 (3.757, 0.273)
2 2.229 1.093 (5.352, 0.517) 4 1.180 0.649 (3.411, 0.229)
Table 20




CVaR ðrnEN ; rnCVaRN Þ α rnE rnCVaR ðrnEN ; rnCVaRN Þ
0.2 5.607 6.535 (6.382, 7.871) 0.8 2.830 3.110 (2.928, 3.370)
0.4 4.078 4.643 (4.428, 5.421) 1.0 2.509 2.715 (2.560, 2.834)
0.6 3.302 3.690 (3.484, 4.154) 1.2 2.274 2.424 (2.298, 2.441)
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8. Conclusion
In this paper, we study the effect of risk aversion for the
competitive newsvendor problem, using CVaR as the risk measure
and considering both quantity competition (proportional demand
allocation and demand reallocation) and price competition (additive
demand and multiplicative demand). For quantity competition, com-
petition always leads to overstocking compared with the integrated
newsvendor, and risk averseness can help counter this effect. How-
ever, whether reducing the overstock leads to increased proﬁts
depends on the demand splitting rule. Under proportional demand
allocation, it does. Under demand reallocation, overstocks induce
demand-expanding switching behaviour, and reduced stocks through
risk averseness may hurt proﬁts.
Price competition always leads to overstocking and proﬁt loss
compared with the integrated newsvendor. Since buying fewer pro-
ducts and offering a lower price increase the probability of selling all
those products, risk averseness can avoid overstocking. In the additive
demand model, this is indeed what always happens. However, in the
multiplicative demand model with normal distributed demand risk,
buying fewer products and offering higher price is another way to
reduce risk, and so the effect of risk averseness is more complex. This
shows that from a supply chain perspective, suppliers should carefully
select retailers with different risk preferences in different competitive
environments.
The results developed in this paper provide valuable insights for
ﬁrms in retail industries. In particular, in a ﬁnancial crisis situation,
ﬁrms face more ﬁerce competition than ever and managers need
decisions tools to assist them in choosing the optimal strategies in
order to hedge the potential risk. To meet this challenge, our paper
provides a comprehensive understanding of different competition
strategies under a risk-averse environment. Under quantity competi-
tion, a comparison of two demand splitting rules reveals that when
retailers have their own original market, then they beneﬁt from risk
averseness by avoiding the overstock. Under price competition, the
equilibrium price depends on how the price affects the potential
market demand. For an additive demand function, retailers order
fewer items and offer a lower price. For a multiplicative demand
function, retailers may choose to order less and charge a higher price.
Our ﬁndings also provide insights into how a supplier chooses its own
retailers with different risk preferences to balance out the effect of risk
aversion on the proﬁt.
Since our results indicate that the risk attitude of the newsvendors
affects the supplier's performance, an interesting direction for further
research is to investigate the impact of risk aversion on the optimal
strategy and proﬁt performance in a decentralized supply chain.
Furthermore, the supplier may not know the degree of risk aversion
of the newsvendor in practice. Therefore, another direction is to study
the issue of information asymmetry with respect to the risk attitude.
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